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The article presents a perspective on the scientific explanation of the subjectivity of
conscious experience. It proposes plausible answers for two empirically valid questions:
the ‘how’ question concerning the developmental mechanisms of subjectivity, and
the ‘why’ question concerning its function. Biological individuation, which is acquired
in several different stages, serves as a provisional description of how subjective
perspectives may have evolved. To the extent that an individuated informational space
seems the most efficient way for a given organism to select biologically valuable
information, subjectivity is deemed to constitute an adaptive response to informational
overflow. One of the possible consequences of this view is that subjectivity might be
(at least functionally) dissociated from consciousness, insofar as the former primarily
facilitates selection, the latter action.
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INTRODUCTION
The subjective or experiential aspect of consciousness constitutes the most perplexing, and
supposedly the hardest, problem for science. There is insufficient space to analyse the complicated
problem of qualia here (for that purpose, see, for example, Dennett, 1988; Crane, 2000) or to
explain the meanings and interrelations between such concepts as phenomenal consciousness,
first-personal perspective, what-it-is-like-ness, for-me-ness and the like (Nagel, 1974; Jackson, 1982;
Levine, 1983, 2001; Block, 1995; Chalmers, 1995, 1996; Kriegel, 2006; Bayne, 2009). However, it
seems quite reasonable to assert that it is subjectivity that is in fact crucial in all those cases1. How
might science account for the subjectivity of conscious experiences? What is the relation between
consciousness and subjectivity? Are there conscious states that are not subjective, or subjective
states that are not conscious? The article presents an empirically supported hypothesis about the
biological origins and function of subjectivity and gives provisional answers to these questions.
BASIC FACTS AND A BASIC FALLACY
From the inside (or subjectively), consciousness consists of a variety of experiences: i.e., feelings,
emotions, desires, sensations, perceptions, dreams, thoughts, etc. From the outside (or objectively),
we can observe particular sorts of behavior and can access neurophysiological data, and (in the case
of humans) may also obtain verbal reports associated with states of consciousness.
1Subjectivity is understood in the article as the epistemic property of being privately or first-personally accessible (see also
Jonkisz, 2012, pp. 60–61).
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Science, we might say, is essentially objective, and conscious
experience essentially subjective: that is just the way they
are. Hence, “. . .subjective, qualitative aspects of consciousness,
being private, cannot be communicated directly through a
scientific theory, which by its nature is public and intersubjective.
Accepting this assumption does not mean that the necessary and
sufficient conditions for consciousness cannot be described. It
implies only that describing them is not the same as generating
and experiencing them” (Edelman and Tononi, 2000, pp. 139–
140). The belief that science will ever permit us to know directly
what it is like to see in color, or ‘what it is like to be a bat’
or any other being different from ourselves, is fallacious when
understood literally. At the same time, though, we can ask
empirically valid and productive questions about the ‘what-it-
is-like-ness’ itself. In other words, qualitative experience is a
property possessed by certain biological systems, not by any
scientific claims or theories. Therefore, if proponents of the so
called knowledge argument (formulated in many versions by,
e.g., Broad, Feigl, Nagel, Jackson), or advocates of the so called
explanatory gap postulate (coined by Levine), claim that science
should provide direct knowledge of other subjects’ experiences,
it may be assumed that their arguments involve a category error
(Pigliucci, 2013). Indeed, the hard problem, formulated this way,
“does not require a solution, but rather, a cure” (see Edelman
et al., 2011, p. 5).
EMPIRICALLY VALID QUESTIONS
There are two standard questions that may be asked about
subjective experience: the ‘why’ and the ‘how’ questions. As
an empirically valid question, the ‘why’ question (i.e., ‘Why
is there subjective experience?’) asks about function. In a
naturalistic scenario, it actually just concerns biological function:
i.e., the evolutionary or adaptive reasons for subjectivity, or
the advantages furnished by subjective experiences for the
functioning of some animal. Meanwhile, two slightly different
‘how’ questions (in the sense of ‘How does it arise?’) may be
distinguished: one about the biological origins of subjectivity
(‘How did subjectivity develop among species?’), the other about
the generation of subjective states in a given organism (‘How are
they produced?’). Both are, in fact, mechanistic questions, as the
former asks about global or developmental mechanisms, the latter
about local or production mechanisms.
CONSCIOUSNESS, INFORMATION, AND
SUBJECTIVITY
All Conscious States are Informational
States
This claim is quite common nowadays; some would even say
that “all the components of consciousness are solely information
in various forms” (see Earl, 2014, pp. 8–9). Obviously the very
notion of information is crucial here, as not all of its versions
seem to fit with consciousness studies (Pockett, 2014). The
currently most popular informational approach to consciousness,
integrated information theory or IIT, began with a rather classical
understanding of information (in terms of uncertainty reduction;
see Tononi, 2004, 2008, p. 217). Nevertheless, Koch and Tononi
claim that “IIT introduces a novel, non-Shannonian notion of
information – integrated information – which can be measured
as ‘differences that make a difference’ to a system from its intrinsic
perspective, not relative to an observer” (Koch and Tononi,
2013). What notion of information is or should be applied here
is a fascinating question in its own right. However, if being
internally differentiated is sufficient for being informational for
given system, as IIT assumes, then, indeed, all conscious states
would seem to be informational states – since it is rather obvious
that in order to be identified at all, states of consciousness must
differ relative to one another when viewed from the internal (i.e.,
subjective) perspective of a given system.
Not All Informational States are
Conscious
That not all information processing is conscious is something
that seems fairly obvious, and is apparently widely endorsed in
cognitive science2. Some claim that not only lower-level, but also
higher-level information processing, which engages prefrontal
areas, is not necessarily conscious (van Gaal and Lamme, 2012) –
not until recurrent processing enters in (e.g., Lamy et al., 2008).
Others maintain that even executive, top-down control might
be carried out unconsciously (Kiefer, 2012). What is significant
for IIT is that even integrated informational states need not
always reach consciousness – as Mudrik and other researchers,
including Koch himself, have argued (Mudrik et al., 2011, 2014).
In at least four cases, that might be the case: when the time and
space of exposure is limited (narrow spatiotemporal window),
when the information is insufficiently semantically complex,
when it is not multimodal, and when it is not novel for the
subject (see Mudrik et al., 2014, pp. 491–494). If this is so, then
not all informational states available within a given system will
necessarily be conscious, even if they are integrated.
All Informational States are Subjective
This claim is by no means obvious. However, IIT does assume
the intrinsic existence of all conscious – i.e., integrated –
informational states (as an axiomatic, Cartesian, phenomeno-
logical feature; see Tononi and Koch, 2015, p. 5)3. Philosophically
speaking, such an assumption is rather fundamental, as it is in
some sense really positing a subjective ontology of consciousness
(Searle, 1992, 2000a,b). A plausible, naturalistic justification of
the subjectivity of informational states will be proposed below,
yet without drawing any ontological consequences (as these are
by no means definite).
2There are, however, exceptions to this claim: e.g., Chalmers, who claims that
“. . .wherever there is a causal interaction, there is information, and wherever
there is information, there is experience,” and that “Experience is information
from the inside; physics information from the outside” (by ‘experience’ he means
‘phenomenal consciousness’; see Chalmers, 1996, p. 297 and p. 305).
3IIT also postulates that a physical mechanism needs to exercise a “cause-effect
power upon itself ” in order to support this feature (pp. 7–8), and characterizes
conscious experience as “maximally irreducible intrinsically conceptual structure”
(or “8max”).
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The phenomenon of consciousness is known only in situ and
in vivo. Hence, if it is to be described in informational terms,
consideration should be given to what kind of information we
are dealing with here, in the case of biological systems. To
the extent that we understand the natural world, accessibility
of information may be considered deeply embedded in our
evolutionary background (Feinberg and Mallatt, 2013). Each and
every creature is morphologically and physiologically attuned
and sensitive only to specific sorts of informational resource (i.e.,
those most efficacious for its ancestors). In other words, earthly
creatures (see Millikan, 2004, p. 9) are naturally constrained
to making use of just certain wavelengths and frequencies of
light and sound, certain chemicals, and only particular capacities
for movement, sensation, etc. These phylogenetic limitations
are further modified epigenetically and socially, becoming still
more specific and unique at the phenotypical level (Fraga et al.,
2005; Swaddle et al., 2005; Bossdorf et al., 2008; Ballestar,
2010; Migicovsky and Kovalchuk, 2011). Finally, informational
states accessible within an individual organism, already heavily
preselected, are shaped by its very own developmental history,
since biological systems are structured by all their past and future
encounters (especially connection patterns in their brains; see
Frith, 2011). The ultimate form and content of states accessed
by an individual subject will be determined by the subject’s
current state and situatedness – that is, by the specific internal
and external conditions the creature is actually subject to (e.g.,
individual physiological parameters, location in a particular
space, contextual relations, ongoing engagements, expectations,
etc.,). As a result, “(a)t any given moment, a process of integration
of collective neuronal activity generates an interwoven pattern of
responses unique to a particular animal at that particular moment
of time” (Edelman et al., 2011, p. 3).
In conclusion, it may be said that information possessing
biological value is always individuated (Jonkisz, 2015)4. And this
may even be put strongly: all informational states, no matter
whether conscious or integrated, are biologically individuated
within a given organism – i.e., directly accessible only from its
internal perspective, meaning only subjectively.
SOME PROVISIONAL ANSWERS
All the factors described above contribute to the complex process
of biological individuation, causing individual differences to occur
in each and every organism at virtually every level (be it genetic,
epigenetic, anatomical, behavioral etc.,). Even monozygotic twins
reared together, or clones, differ significantly, as it is not possible
to mimic all the environmental interactions and physiological
conditions involved in forming each phenotype (Pfefferbaum
et al., 2004; Fraga et al., 2005; Ballestar, 2010; Maiti et al., 2011;
Freund et al., 2013). In the light of this, the conclusion that
individual differences are also present at a given organism’s
cognitive or epistemic level seems quite plausible (in the sense
that what the organism is able to perceive or experience will also
4The notion of individuation has played a central role in the philosophical theories
developed by Simondon, and fits neatly into the context being described in the
article (Simondon, 2005; Iliadis, 2013).
be unique, meaning directly accessible only from its perspective,
i.e., subjectively). Ultimately, it may be said that the process of
biological individuation furnishes, at the very least, a provisional
answer to the question concerning the origins or developmental
mechanisms of subjectivity (‘How did subjectivity develop among
species?’). Below, a plausible hypothesis is presented which also
answers the question concerning biological function (‘Why is
there subjective experience?’).
What adaptive advantages might subjectivity furnish for the
functioning of an animal? It is a rather obvious empirical
observation, that the survival of an animal is determined by
its ability to pick out the most efficient patterns of action
and adapt them to the changing conditions of the moment.
However, in a complex, ever-changing environment, organisms
are potentially able to discern an infinite amount of information
and an infinite number of states. Therefore, there is likely to
be strong evolutionary pressure on their ability to minimize
the more redundant states and select the most efficient ones.
That is probably part of the reason why the plethora of
possible informational resources is subject to such a degree
of phylogenetic reduction and ontogenetic preselection (as
described in “All Informational States are Subjective”). What
remains accessible is what is potentially most useful, in a
Bayesian sense, and hence most valuable biologically – both for a
given species and for the individual organism. More specifically,
one may say that those networks of experiential/informational
associations that have worked well for an organism in the past
form biases triggered by similar future occurrences. Attentional
priorities for spotting differences (novelties) in the ongoing
unfolding of informational states, together with the emotional
markers ascribed to them, enable further learning and adaptation
(brain plasticity and neuronal group selection, or so called
neural Darwinism, account well for this picture; see Cleeremans,
2011; Edelman et al., 2011; Frith, 2011; Baars, 2012). From
this perspective, organisms may be viewed as Bayesian systems
specializing in anticipating what the future will bring and
discriminating what is best for them from their individual,
unique and private point of view – i.e., a subjective one. The
process of formation of such an individuated informational
space (accessed only subjectively), occurring in several distinct
stages (described above), is likely to be the most efficient way
of selecting biologically valuable information, and is therefore
justified as far as the functioning of the animal is concerned.
We may thus conclude that the hypothesis according to which
subjectivity might be seen (functionally) as an adaptive response
to informational overflow seems valid and plausible.
The hypothesized function of subjectivity (the selection
of overflowing information) is partly supported by empirical
evidence pertaining to both the bottom-up and the top-down
influence of bodily factors on information processing (see
Theeuwes, 2010; Fleming et al., 2010; Rochat, 2011; Shimono
et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2013; Pfeifer et al., 2014). The
way our bodies are shaped (by their evolutionary background,
developmental conditions, current engagements and actual
physiological state) determine informational states’ availability,
resulting in the formation of individuated informational spaces
for each and every organism (the statistically most useful ones).
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The foregoing considerations have introduced provisional
answers for questions about the function of subjectivity (the
‘why’ question) and its developmental mechanisms (a global
‘how’ question). What still remains is the local ‘how’ question
concerning the production of subjective experiences within
an organism. The task of discovering experimentally the
mechanisms responsible for generating states of consciousness
has proved to be by far the most challenging one. We still seem
far away from any sort of end to that journey, even though
much knowledge about the neuronal areas engaged and the
processes involved has been gathered (Metzinger, 2000; Crick
and Koch, 2003; Hohwy, 2009; Lamme, 2010; Panagiotaropoulos
et al., 2012; Baars, 2012). Amongst the findings so far, a few
promising models have been elaborated: e.g., GWT and GNW,
RP, and the more abstract IIT model (Baars, 1994, 1996; Dehaene
et al., 1998; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Tononi, 2004, 2008;
Lamme, 2006; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Baars et al., 2013;
Tononi and Koch, 2015). Indeed, the generation problem seems
to represent the most difficult challenge for science, though
it does seem to remain tractable from the standpoint of an
empirical science of consciousness. Undeniable proof that the
hard problem had been solved would probably need to take
the form of an at least minimally conscious artifact (Kurzweil,
2012; O’Regan, 2012). However, still more effective treatments,
enabling a regaining of consciousness in patients who have
lost vital components of the latter, would offer important
indicators of the right path having been followed (Giacino,
2005).
CONCLUSION
The article presents a provisional account of both the
developmental mechanism of subjectivity (described here
as biological individuation) and its function (described as
an adaptive response to informational overflow). It also
points to some fairly unconventional conclusions about the
relation between subjectivity and consciousness. All conscious
states count as informational (see “All Conscious States are
Informational States”), but not all informational states (even
those that are integrated) count as conscious (see “Not All
Informational States are Conscious”). It is also argued that all
informational states are subjective (biologically individuated,
see “All Informational States are Subjective”). While it is
generally considered quite acceptable to claim that all conscious
states are subjective (as is entailed by “All Conscious States
are Informational States” and “All Informational States are
Subjective”), the conclusion that some subjective states are
not conscious (as is entailed by “Not All Informational States
are Conscious” and “All Informational States are Subjective”)
remains rather unpopular.
Subjectivity, as an adaptive strategy for selecting the most
useful informational resources, might in fact be dissociated
from consciousness, at least functionally. (That idea was first
developed in Jonkisz, 2009; the separation presented here
have consequences whose significance is above all explanatory).
Whereas subjectivity, as described here, primarily facilitates
selection (based on Bayesian statistics), consciousness may be
seen as a phenomenon that primarily facilitates action (Jonkisz,
2015). The overall picture may be briefly described as follows:
both the bottom-up bodily factors (genetic, epigenetic, and
developmental) and the top-down priming effects or expectations
(based on prior experiences) serve not only to reduce the number
of possible states, but also to bias accessible ones toward or
against certain other informational states (Fleming et al., 2010;
Theeuwes, 2010; Rochat, 2011; Shimono et al., 2012; Zhou et al.,
2013; Pfeifer et al., 2014). Hence, every creature ultimately
‘works on’ a biologically individuated informational space that
consists of all of the possible experiential/informational contents
formed within the system5. Those of the subjective, informational
contents that are actually utilized in action become conscious,
where this is likely to occur in a gradational manner (see Jonkisz,
2015; for the crucial role of action, see also, e.g., Gibson, 1977,
1979; Noë, 2006; Engel et al., 2013; etc.,).
Our general conclusion, then, is that subjectivity, which
develops through many stages of biological individuation, is
inherited in the form of our being-in-the-world. We are all
structurally, functionally, and phenomenally different (as already
mentioned, even monozygotic twins and clones, similar as they
appear to be and actually are, differ significantly, see Pfefferbaum
et al., 2004; Fraga et al., 2005; Ballestar, 2010; Maiti et al., 2011;
Freund et al., 2013). A complex and dynamic ecosystem, unique
in itself, contains myriads of unique, individuated systems with
their own private perspectives. Admittedly, subjective Bayesian
systems are fallible in their heuristic processing, being prone
to illusion and undetected error (Lotto and Purves, 2002;
Rossano, 2003; Lotto, 2004), yet this is forgivable, as biological
individuation has itself most likely brought about not only a
balance between efficacy and economy in their interactions with
their environment, but also the emergence of selves (Rochat,
2011).
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